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ABSTRACT
Many network resource allocation problems can be viewed as al-
locating a divisible resource, where the allocations are constrained
to lie in a polymatroid. We consider market-based mechanisms for
such problems. Though the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mech-
anism can provide the efficient allocation with strong incentive
properties (namely dominant strategy incentive compatibility), its
well-known high communication requirements can prevent it from
being used. There have been a number of approaches for reducing
the communication costs of VCG by weakening its incentive prop-
erties. Here, instead we take a different approach of reducing com-
munication costs via quantization while maintaining VCG’s domi-
nant strategy incentive properties. The cost for this approach is a
loss in efficiency which we characterize. We first consider quantiz-
ing the resource allocations so that agents need only submit a finite
number of bids instead of full utility function. We subsequently
consider quantizing the agent’s bids.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Networks→Network economics;Network performance anal-
ysis; • Social and professional topics→Information system eco-
nomics.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Efficient allocation of limited resources is a fundamental prob-
lem in networked systems. Economic-based models are a common
way of addressing this problem. In such models, agents are en-
dowed with utility functions and the goal is to maximize the social
welfare, given by the sum of the agents’ utilities. Hence, given the
agents’ utility functions, efficient resource allocation then reduces
to solving an optimization problem. In networked systems, two
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challenges to such an approach are (1) the agents are distributed
and only limited communication may be available to communi-
cate user utilities and resource allocations decisions, and (2) self-
interested users may not have incentive to correctly report their
utilities.
The incentive issue has been studied through the lens of mech-
anism design. One of the most celebrated results in this literature
is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [1–3], which pro-
vides an elegant solution to the incentive issue. In the VCG mech-
anism, each agent is required to report her utility function and in
turn receives an allocation and makes a payment based on the re-
ports of every agent. Through a carefully designed payment, the
VCG mechanism achieves the efficient outcome under a strong in-
centive guarantee. Namely, it is dominant strategy incentive com-
patible (DSIC) for agents to truthfully report their utility and if
they do so, then the mechanism simply maximizes the sum of the
reported utility, yielding the efficient outcome. However, in the
context of divisible network resources, such as power, bandwidth
or storage space, each agent’s utility may be infinite dimensional
and hence VCG mechanisms do not address the issue of limited
communication.
The limited communication issue has also been well studied. In
particular, we highlight the seminal work of Kelly, [4, 5], in which
agents submit one-dimensional bids and receive an allocation de-
termined by the ratio of their bid and a congestion price. For price-
taking agents, who do not anticipate the impact of their actions on
the price, this mechanism can lead to the socially optimal alloca-
tion, but as shown in [6], when buyers can anticipate the impact
of their actions on congestion price, this mechanism can lead to an
efficiency loss.
In [7, 8], a “VCG-Kelly"mechanismwas proposed that combined
the one-dimensional bids in Kelly’s mechanism and the VCG pay-
ment rule. This mechanism is shown to obtain the socially optimal
outcome as with VCG. However, the incentive guarantee is relaxed
to the weaker notion of Nash equilibria instead of a dominant strat-
egy equilibria as in VCG.1
In our previous work, [9, 10], we introduced an alternative ap-
proach for reducing communication costswhilemaintaining VCG’s
dominant strategy incentive properties when allocating a single di-
visible resource. This approach was to quantize the resource and
then run VCG on the quantized resource. This incurs some effi-
ciency loss, which was bounded. We build on this approach in this
paper, but instead of a single divisible resource, we consider re-
source allocations that are constrained to lie within a polymatroid
in RN
+
, where N is the number of agents. Such a polymatroid en-
vironment is a natural and non-trivial generalization of a single
divisible resource. For example, if the single divisible resource rep-
resents the rate on a given link in a network, then a polymatroid
1Justifying a Nash equilibria requires that agents are aware of each others’ pay-offs
(and rationality) or apply some type of dynamic process to reach this point.
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can be viewed as giving the region of rates obtainable by differ-
ent source-destination pairs across a network with multiple links
(see e.g. [11]). As shown in [12, 13], mechanisms for single links
may not work when applied in a more general network setting.
Polymatroid environments can also model many other network
settings such as multiclass queueing systems [14], various network
flow problems [15–17], spectrum sharing [18, 19] and problems in
network information theory [20–22]. Given a polymatroid feasible
region, we study quantized VCG mechanisms and the resulting ef-
ficiency losses for strategic agents.
The contributions of this paper are the following:
• Given a polymatroid environment, we determine a way to
quantize the resource into partitions so that a feasible allo-
cation of partitions lies in an integral polymatroid.
• Based on the integral polymatroid, we propose a quantized
VCG mechanism for allocating partitions. This mechanism
inherits VCG’s DSIC property and further, due to the poly-
matroid structure, can be implemented using a greedy algo-
rithm. We also characterize the worst-case efficiency loss of
this mechanism due to the quantization.
• In addition to the quantization of the resource, we further
study a rounded VCG mechanism in which the agents’ bids
are also quantized. The bid quantization results in the mech-
anism no longer being DSIC, but we show that ϵ-dominant
strategies exist. We characterize the worst-case efficiency
for three different types of such strategies.
• We analyze the trade-off between communication cost and
overall efficiency in our proposed mechanisms. We further
discuss the impact of the parameters in each mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Sect. 2, we re-
view some properties of polymatroids and the VCG mechanism.
Our two classes of quantized mechanisms are introduced and ana-
lyzed in Sect. 3-4. We conclude the paper in Sect. 5.
Notations:RN
+
andNN denote the set of nonnegative real-valued
and integer-valued vectors of dimension N , respectively. We use
⌊x⌋ for the floor, ⌈x⌉ for the ceiling, and {x} for the fractional part
of x . We denote by σ−i the subset of σ for everybody except for
agent i and (z,σ−i ) denotes the set σ with the ith component re-
placed with z. We write [·]+ as the projection onto the nonnegative
orthant. The indicator function1w equals 1 if the eventw happens,
otherwise 0.
2 MODEL AND BACKGROUND
2.1 Polymatroids
We begin by reviewing some basic definitions and properties
related to polymatroids.
Definition 2.1. [23] Given a finite ground setN = {1, · · · ,N }, a
set function f : 2N → R is submodular if:
f (S) + f (T ) ≥ f (S ∩T ) + f (S ∪T ),
for any subsets S and T of N . If the inequality holds strictly, the
set function f is strictly submodular.
An equivalent definition for submodularity is:
f (S ∪ {i}) + f (S ∪ {j}) ≥ f (S) + f (S ∪ {i, j}),
for any S ⊆ N and distinct i, j ∈ N \ S .
A set function f : 2N → R is normalized if f (∅) = 0; monotone
(non-decreasing) if f (S) ≤ f (T ), ∀S ⊆ T ; and integer-valued if
f (S) ∈ Z,∀S ⊆ N .
Definition 2.2. Let
Pf = {x ∈ RN+ |
∑
n∈S
xn ≤ f (S),∀S ∈ N}.
If the set function f is normalized,monotone and submodular, then
Pf is a polymatroid with rank function f .
If the rank function of a polymatroid is integer-valued, then it
follows that all of corner points are also integer valued. Further, it
can sometimes be convenient to regard an integral polymatroid, i.e.,
a polymatroid consisting of only points in NN instead of points in
R
N [23]. We adopt this view here when discussing integral poly-
matroids.
The following are two well known properties of polymatroids.
Lemma 2.3. Given a polymatroid Pf , if x
∗ ∈ Pf , then the polyhe-
dron
Pf − x∗ := {x ∈ RN+ |
∑
n∈S
xn ≤ f (S) −
∑
n∈S
x∗n , ∀S ∈ N}.
is also a polymatroid with rank function f˜ , where
f˜ (S) = min
T :S⊆T
(f (T ) −
∑
n∈T
x∗n ).
Lemma 2.4. For any polymatroid Pf , there exists a x ∈ Pf such
that
∑N
n=1 xn = f (N).
The second lemma shows that the sum constraint over all N
is always tight for some point within the polymatroid. The set of
all such points is referred to as the polymatroid’s dominant face,
which is formally defined next.
Definition 2.5. The dominant face of a polymatroid Pf , denoted
by D(Pf ), is defined as:
D(Pf ) = {x ∈ RN+ |x ∈ Pf ,
N∑
n=1
xn = f (N)}.
As defined in [24], the minimum distance of a set function f
over a ground set N is:
△ f := min
S⊆N
min
i, j∈N\S
|Df (S ∪ {i},S ∪ {j})|, (1)
where the distance Df (S,T ) between two arbitrary subsets S and
T is defined as:
Df (S,T ) = f (S) + f (T ) − f (S ∩T ) − f (S ∪T ). (2)
This can be thought of as an indication of how strictly supermodu-
lar the set function is. For a submodular function f , the distance be-
tween two arbitrary subsets is always non-negative. Furthermore,
if the set function f is strictly submodular, then the minimum dis-
tance △f is strictly greater than 0.
Following [24], we have the following theorem:
Theorem 2.6. Given a polymatroid Pf with △f = 0, then for any
η > 0, there exists another polymatroid P
f˜
such that △ f˜ > 0 and
f (S) − f˜ (S) ≤ η,∀S ⊆ N .
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Proof. Let д be a normalized set function defined as д(S) =
|Sc |2 for any nonempty set S . Then let f˜ (∅) = 0 and f˜ (S) = f (S) −
γд(S) for any nonempty set S . With a small value of γ , we can
make sure the difference between f and f˜ is less than η. Moreover,
since −д(S) is submodular with a nonnegative minimum distance,
we can show f˜ is a rank function with △ f˜ > 0. The detailed proof
is omitted due to space consideration. 
The above theorem shows that given any polymatroid, we can
find another polymatroid with positive minimum distance such
that the new polymatroid lies in the given one and the discrepancy
could be arbitrarily small. Due to this reason, in the remainder of
the paper, we only consider polymatroids constrained by set func-
tions with positive minimum distance.2
2.2 Social Welfare Maximization Problem
We consider a model where a set of N agents are competing
for a resource constrained by a polymatroid environment. Denote
the set of agents as N = {1, · · · ,N }. A feasible allocation x =
{xn }Nn=1 is then any point that lies in a polymatroid associatedwith
a set function f over N . In particular, the agents in any subset S
could obtain a total allocation of at most f (S), i.e.,∑n∈S xn ≤ f (S).
Without loss of generality, we assume that f (N) = 1. Moreover,
each individual’s allocation must be non-negative and hence x ∈
R
N
+
.
Each agent is endowed with a utility function un(xn ), which
only depends on the agent’s final allocation. Throughout this pa-
per, these utility functions satisfy the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. Each agent’s utility function is only known by
that agent, i.e., it is private information.
Assumption 2. The utility functions un are nonnegative, con-
cave, and strictly increasing.
Assumption 3. For all agents, the marginal utility per unit re-
source is bounded, that is, there exist positive constants α and β such
that for any agent n, β < u ′n < α . These bounds are public informa-
tion.
Assumption 4. The utility functions are in monetary units and
each agent’s quasilinear payoff is defined as un(xn ) − pn , where pn
is the payment for the allocated resource.
Assumption 1 results in the incentive issue: utilities are private
information, each agent may lie about them. Assumption 2 and
3 show agents have “elastic" resource requirements and the unit
value for the resource lies within some range, which is reasonable
in many practical settings. The last assumption is widely adopted
in pricing mechanisms and the quasilinear structure makes each
agent’s strategy and the corresponding final allocation dependent
on the payment rule in this game as well as the utility functions.
Under this setting, the goal of the allocator is to make the best
use of the resource, i.e., to maximize the social welfare. This is
2If this is not the case, then we can use the above construction and as will be evident
it would have negligible impact on the resulting efficiency of our mechanisms.
given by solving the following optimization problem:
max
N∑
n=1
un(xn ) (3)
subject to x ∈ Pf = {x ∈ RN+ |
∑
n∈S
xn ≤ f (S),∀S ∈ N}.
Since the total sum constraint is always binding in polymatroids,
we have the following result from [25]. We give a proof of this for
completeness.
Proposition 2.7. The optimal solution to optimization problem
(3) lies on the dominant face of the polymatroid.
Proof. We show this by means of contradiction. Suppose x∗ is
the optimal solution, but
∑N
n=1 x
∗
n < f (N). Then we can construct
a new polymatroid Pд by subtracting the optimal solution x∗:
Pд = {x ∈ RN+ |
∑
n∈S
xn ≤ f (S) −
∑
n∈S
x∗n , ∀S ∈ N}. (4)
The new set function is д(S) = f (S) −∑n∈S x∗n , which satisfies the
properties for set function to define a polymatroid. Since f (N) −∑N
n=1 x
∗
n > 0, the polymatroid Pд is not empty and so we can find a
nonzero vector x′ inside. Moreover, each utility function is strictly
increasing, hence
∑N
n=1 un(x∗n + x ′n ) >
∑N
n=1 un(x∗n ), which is a
contradiction. This finishes the proof. 
2.3 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism
Next we review the VCG mechanism. In this mechanism, the al-
locator asks agents to report their utility functions and determines
the allocation which maximizes the social welfare under the re-
portedutilities. The VCGpayments for given agent is then given by
the difference between the total utility the other agents would have
received if the given agent was not present and the total utility that
they received based on the reported utilities.3 In other words, each
agent’s payment equals the increase in the others’ sum utility if
she is absent.
Definition 2.8. [26] A mechanism where players have private
information is said to be dominant-strategy incentive-compatible
(DSIC) if it is a weakly-dominant strategy for every player to re-
veal his/her private information.
The VCG mechanism is DSIC, and given that agents follow the
dominant strategy of reporting their true utility, the mechanisms
will be efficient, i.e. it will maximize the social welfare.
2.4 Quantized VCG Mechanism
Given a divisible resource, the utility function an agent submits
in the VCG mechanism can be an arbitrary real valued function
of the amount of resource obtained. As we have discussed, this
can result in the excessive communication overhead. Next we dis-
cuss the approach in [9] for limiting this overhead via quantization,
when the resource is a single divisible resource, i.e., the resource
constraint is given by
∑
n∈N xn ≤ 1. In this approach, the allo-
cator partitions the whole resource into M divisions equally and
3This is the most common form of VCG payments known as the Clarke pivot rule,
more generally changing agent n’s payment by any function that does not depend on
the reported utility of agent n is also valid.
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restricts agents to get an integer number of divisions. Essentially,
this mechanism then runs a VCG mechanism for the quantized re-
source. Under this setting, each agent n only needs to submit M
bids:vn1, · · · ,vnM , wherevnm indicates agent n’s marginal utility
from getting anmth additional unit of resource. This reduces the
information an agent needs to submit from specifying an infinite
dimensional function to specifying an M-dimensional vector. For
small values of M , this quantization also simplifies the optimiza-
tion faced by the resource allocator as it can now determine the
socially optimal allocation via a greedy algorithm instead of need-
ing to solve a convex optimization problem.4 Finally, since this is
still a VCG mechanism, it it still DSIC and implements the social
optimal outcome with the quantized resource. However there is
a loss in efficiency due to the quantization of the resource. In [9],
tight bounds on this loss are given. Specifically, the efficiency (de-
fined as the ratio of the welfare with M divisions to the optimal
welfare without quantization) is shown to always be no less than
M
M + N − 1 (5)
where N is the number of agents. Here we extend this to polyma-
troid environments.
3 QUANTIZING VCG FOR POLYMATROIDS
In this section, we give two toy examples that show blindly par-
titioning the resource into devisions may result in a large efficiency
loss or the failure of greedy algorithm for determining the assign-
ment.
Example 3.1. Consider two agents competing for the resource,
where the feasible region is a polymatroid Pf = {(x1,x2) ∈ R2+ |x1 ≤
0.6,x2 ≤ 0.6,x1 + x2 ≤ 1}, their utilities are u1(x1) = 2x1 and
u2(x2) = x2, respectively.
For the setting in Example 1, suppose we partition the total re-
source into 3 divisions equally (M = 3), so that the amount of each
division is 13 . The feasible region for the number of divisions each
agent can get then becomes:5
P
f˜
= {(y1,y2) ∈ N2 |y1 ≤ 1,y2 ≤ 1,y1 + y2 ≤ 3}.
Observe that here the constraint function is no longer submodular
and the sum constraint in P
f˜
is never tight. In particular note that
the maximum number of divisions allocated is now 2 (y1 +y2 ≤ 2),
which means that 1/3 of the total resource is never allocated. For
the given utilities this results in an efficiency of 0.63,which is lower
than the value of 0.75 given by the bound in (5).6 By changing the
parameters in this example, even lower efficiencies are possible.
Example 3.2. Consider the following polymatroid as the feasi-
ble region: Pf = {x ∈ R3+ |x1 ≤ 0.7,x2 ≤ 0.7,x3 ≤ 0.7,x1 + x2 ≤
4Also note that using a greedy algorithm gives the exact social optimal for the quan-
tized problem, while when solving the convex optimization, the solution will typically
be with some ϵ specified by the algorithm used. For large ϵ , this in turn could impact
the incentive guarantee of VCG.
5Here we are assuming that any quantized allocation has to respect the original
constrains in Pf ; hence, for example, agent 1 can not receive two divisions since
2/3 > 0.6.
6Moreover this poor efficiency is obtained with linear utilities, which lead to no loss
in the setting in [9].
0.9,x2 + x3 ≤ 0.9,x1 + x3 ≤ 0.9,x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 1}, the utility func-
tions for the agents are u1(x1) = 1.2x1, u2(x2) = 1.1x2, u3(x3) = x3.
Similarly, if we partition the resource in Example 2 into 3 divi-
sions, then the feasible region for number of divisions each agent
can get is:
P
f˜
={(y1,y2,y3) ∈ N3 |y1 ≤ 2,y2 ≤ 2,y3 ≤ 2,y1 + y2 ≤ 2,
y1 + y3 ≤ 2,y2 + y3 ≤ 2,y1 + y2 + y3 ≤ 3}.
In this case y = (1, 1, 1) is a feasible solution and the correspond-
ing allocation is x = ( 13 , 13 , 13 ). In this case, all of the resource
is allocated and the social welfare is 1.1. However, if we use the
greedy algorithm to find the optimal allocation given the true mar-
ginal valuations, the solution and the corresponding allocation are
y∗ = (2, 0, 0) and x∗ = ( 23 , 0, 0), respectively. This results in a social
welfare of 0.8 which is less than the value of 1.1 obtained by the
feasible solution (1, 1, 1). In other words the greedy algorithm no
longer gives the optimal quantized allocation. The issue again is
that P
f˜
is not a polymatroid.
These two examples illustrate that in a polymatroid environ-
ment more care is needed when quantizing the resource. In both
cases, the issue is that region resulting from quantization is no
longer a polymatroid. Next we discuss an approach to ensure that
this does not occur by ensuring that the region P
f˜
obtained after
quantization is always an integral polymatroid.
3.1 Integral Polymatroid Construction
Given a real-valued polymatroid, Pf ,we next show that if a large
enough number of partitions are used, then the issues in the previ-
ous two examples do not arise. The construction for doing this is
given in Algorithm 1. This algorithm specifies an integral set P
f˜
,
which indicates the number of quantized partitions for each agent.
Algorithm 1 Resource Partition
Inputs: Polymatroid Pf associated with set function f , which
has the minimum distance △f .
Choose integer M such thatM ≥ 2△f .
for S ⊆ N do
f˜ (S) = ⌊ f (S)M⌋;
end for
Wenext give several properties of the set P
f˜
given by Algorithm
1. First, it is straightforward to see the following lemma, which
states that any constraint in P
f˜
is within 1M of the corresponding
constraint in Pf and that the sum constraints are the same.
Lemma 3.3. For any S ⊆ N , 0 ≤ f (S) − f˜ (S )M < 1M ; further,
f˜ (N)
M = f (N) = 1.
Next we show that the constraints in P
f˜
always allow any set
of users to have at least two partitions. (Note this is not the case
for Example 1 in the previous section whenM = 3).
Proposition 3.4. For any non-empty subset S ⊆ N , f˜ (S) ≥ 2.
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Proof. First, according to the definition of the minimum dis-
tance, for any agent i and j, we have:
△f ≤ f ({i}) + f ({j}) − f (∅) − f ({i, j}) ≤ f (i).
Hence, for any nonempty subset S , we can find i ∈ S and
f˜ (S) = ⌊ f (S) 2△f ⌋ ≥ ⌊ f ({i})
2
△f ⌋ ≥ 2.

Finally we show that P
f˜
is an integral polymatroid.
Theorem 3.5. The polyhedron, P
f˜
, associated with f˜ given by
Algorithm 1 is an integral polymatroid.
Proof. First, we know f˜ (∅) = ⌊ f (∅)M⌋ = 0, so f˜ is normalized.
For monotonicity, consider two sets S and T such that S ⊆ T ,
since f is monotonically increasing, then
f˜ (S) = ⌊ f (S)M⌋ ≤ ⌊ f (T )M⌋ = f˜ (T ). (6)
Moreover, we have
f˜ (S + {e1}) + f˜ (S + {e2})
≥Mf (S + {e1}) − 1 +Mf (S + {e2}) − 1
≥M(△f + f (S) + f (S + {e1} + {e2})) − 2
≥M △ f − 2 + f˜ (S) + f˜ (S + {e1} + {e2})
≥ f˜ (S) + f˜ (S + {e1} + {e2}), (7)
where we used the definition of minimum distance and the fact
that M ≥ 2△f , respectively, in the last two steps. Therefore, f˜ is
submodular and P
f˜
is an integral polymatroid. 
Since Pf¯ is a polymatroid, there always exists an allocation on
its dominant face and by construction f˜ (N) = M , so that any such
allocation will utilize all of the available resource.
3.2 Quantized VCG Mechanism
Given the feasible region Pf , we define a quantized VCG mech-
anism as a mechanisms in which the agents are only allocated an
integer number divisions, where the set of allocations must lie in
the integral polymatroid P
f˜
constructed in Algorithm 1.
Under this setting, the optimal allocation is x∗ = 1M y
∗, where
y∗ is the optional allocation of divisions given by the following
integer optimization problem:
maximize
N∑
n=1
un(
yn
M
) (8)
subject to y ∈ P
f˜
.
Corollary 3.6. The maximizer y∗ lies on the dominant face of
P
f˜
.
This is a straightforward generalization of Proposition 1 to the
discrete setting and can be proven in a similar manner. Note also
from the discussion above, such a solution will utilize all of the
resource.
To determine the allocation, the resource allocator essentially
runs a VCG mechanism for the possible allocations in P
f˜
. This re-
quires each agent to submit its valuation for each possible bundle
of units it can obtain. Since each agent n can get at most f˜ ({n})
units, agent n only needs to report f˜ ({n}) values: un(ynM ), 1 ≤
yn ≤ f˜ ({n}). Equivalently, agent n can submit the marginal utility
instead. Note that the range of the marginal values will be smaller
than the range of the actual utility values and so in some sense re-
porting the marginal values also reduces the communication cost.
This will be made more precise in the next section, when we also
consider quantizing the bids. The marginal utility is denoted by
Vn = {vn1, · · · ,vnf˜ ({n })}, where
vnm = un(m
M
) − un(m − 1
M
), 1 ≤ m ≤ f˜ ({n}. (9)
Furthermore, underAssumption 3, all utility functions have bounded
marginal valuations and hence each bid vnm is lower bounded by
β
M . To further reduce the range of bids, we can require agent n to
submit the surrogate marginal utility vˆnm = vnm − βM so that:
un(
yn
M
) =
yn∑
m=1
vˆnm +
βyn
M
. (10)
Notice that both vnm and vˆnm are non-increasing inm due to the
concavity of un .
The detailed mechanism is as follows:
• Determine the number of partitions and partition the re-
source intoM divisions equally using Algorithm 1. The fea-
sible region for number of units is P
f˜
.
• Solicit and accept sealed surrogate marginal utility vectors
Vˆn = {vˆn1, · · · ,vnf˜ ({n })}.
• Determine the allocationof divisions that optimize (8) where
the objective is the utility given by the given bids Vˆn . The
final allocation agent n gets is y∗n . The sum of bids picked is
denoted by
OPT(Vˆ ) =
N∑
n=1
y∗n∑
m=1
vˆnm . (11)
• Set price pn for agent n as:
pn = OPT(0, Vˆ−n) − (OPT(Vˆ ) −
y∗n∑
m=1
vˆnm ) +
y∗nβ
M
.
We next give a greedy algorithm in Algorithm 2 to determine the
allocation in (8). With this algorithm, the resources are allocated
unit by unit. At each pass through, the algorithm maintains a list
J (y) of feasible agents who can still receive an additional unit of
resource. It then assign the next unit to the agent from this set with
the largest surrogate marginal utility.
Based on [27–29], [30] establishes the following theorem:
Theorem 3.7. Suppose J ⊆ NN is a down-monotone and finite
family of integer nonnegative vectors. The greedy algorithm opti-
mizes a separable concave function over J if and only if J is an
integral polymatroid.
Using this result, we can show the following theorem:
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Algorithm 2 Greedy allocation algorithm
Inputs: Integer-valued polymatroid P
f˜
; N descending list:
Vˆ1, · · · , VˆN , the first element of Vˆn is denoted by Vˆn[0].
Initialization: Set y = 0,N = {1, · · · ,N },J (y) = N .
while J (y) is not empty do
n = argmaxi ∈N{Vˆi [0]} (break ties arbitrarily);
yn + = 1;
Remove the first element from Vˆn ;
if not Vˆn then
Remove n from N ;
end if
J (y) = {i |(yi + 1,y−i ) ∈ Pf˜ , i ∈ N};
end while
Theorem 3.8. Given the surrogate marginal utility vectors Vˆ , for
any set of concave and non-decreasing utility functions u such that
for each agent n, un(ynM ) =
∑yn
m=1 vˆnm +
βyn
M , then y
∗(Vˆ ) given by
Algorithm 2 is the optimizer to problem (8) and the optimal outcome
is OPT(Vˆ ) + β , i.e.,
y∗(Vˆ ) = arg max
y∈P
f˜
N∑
n=1
un(
yn
M
), (12)
max
y∈P
f˜
N∑
n=1
un(
yn
M
) =
N∑
n=1
un(
y∗n(Vˆ )
M
) = OPT(Vˆ ) + β . (13)
Proof. Combining Theorem 3.7 and Corollary 3.6 yields (12).
We can show (13) according to the definition of OPT(Vˆ ). The de-
tailed proof is omitted here. 
This theorem shows the allocation determined by the greedy al-
gorithm is the optimal solution to problem (8) assuming the submit-
ted surrogate marginal utilities are truthful. Next we show telling
the truth is the (weakly) dominant strategy for each agent.
Corollary 3.9. The quantized VCG mechanism is DSIC.
Proof. The difference between marginal utility and surrogate
utility is more of an implementation issue. There is a one to one
mapping between them and having agents send one or the other
is equivalent. The last term
y∗nβ
M in the payment compensates the
difference ensuring the quantized VCG mechanism is still DSIC.

3.3 Examples of Quantized VCG Performance
In this section we examine the performance of the quantized
VCG mechanism for the two examples introduced in the previous
section. In the following section, we turn to analyzing the perfor-
mance in more general settings.
Example 1 (continued): Recall, for the original polymatroid Pf ,
the optimal allocation is x∗ = (0.6, 0.4). For Pf , we can find the
minimum distance is △f = 0.2. Hence, following Algorithm 2, we
have M ≥ 20.2 = 10. Fig. 1 shows the allocation (x1, x2) given
by the quantized VCG mechanism asM varies. Also shown are the
optimal allocations in Pf . It can be seen that with 10 partitions, the
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Figure 1: Performance of the quantizedVCGmechanism for
Example 1.
quantized VCG allocation is close to the optimal and approaches it
further asM increases.
Example 2 (continued): For this example, the optimal alloca-
tion is x∗ = (0.7, 0.2, 0.1) and the minimum distance is △f = 0.5.
Hence, from Algorithm 2 we have M ≥ 20.5 = 4. Fig. 1 shows
the allocation (x1, x2,x3) as a function of the number of divisions.
Again, the allocation given by the quantized VCG mechanism is
close to the optimal allocation forM = 4 and becomes closer asM
increases.
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Figure 2: Performance of the quantizedVCGmechanism for
Example 2.
Also these figures show the trade-off between the efficiency of
the quantized VCG mechanism and the communication cost. As
we increase the number of partitions, the difference between the
allocation given by the quantized VCGmechanism and the optimal
solution is smaller, giving better efficiency. On the other hand, a
larger number of partitions means a larger communication cost
(and larger computational costs).
3.4 Efficiency Analysis
As in much of the literature, we evaluate the performance of the
quantizedVCGmechanism via the worst-case efficiency. This is de-
fined as the ratio between the social welfare given by the quantized
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VCG mechanism and the optimal social welfare without quantiza-
tion in the worst case (over the class of admissible utilities). Specif-
ically, the worst-case efficiency for our mechanism is:
inf
u1, · · · ,uN
maxy∈P
f˜
∑N
n=1 un(
yn
M )
maxx∈Pf
∑N
n=1 un(xn )
, (14)
where ui is any utility function satisfying Assumptions 2 and 3.
Theorem 3.10. For a system with N agents, suppose we partition
the resource into M divisions equally and run the quantized VCG
mechanism as proposed, whereM satisfies the condition in Algorithm
2. In this case, the efficiency is at least
Mβ + 2(α − β)
Mα + 2(α − β) − [M − N + 1]+(α − β) .
Proof. If x∗ is the optimal solution without quantization, then
y = ⌊x∗M⌋ must lie in P
f˜
. In addition, we can always find y˚ on the
dominant face of P
f˜
−y, which is also a polymatroid by Lemma 2.3
(and is also integral since y is integer-valued). Hence,
∑N
n=1 y˚n =
M−∑Nn=1⌊x∗nM⌋ = ∑Nn=1{x∗nM} and so y+y˚ is a feasible allocation
of divisions on the dominant face of P
f˜
.
Thus, the efficiency is lower bounded by
∑N
n=1 un(
yn+y˚n
M )∑N
n=1 un(x∗n)
≥
∑N
n=1 un(
yn
M ) +
β
M
∑N
n=1 y˚n∑N
n=1 un(x∗n )
. (15)
Recall that the utility functions are concave and for agent n we
have:
un(x∗n ) ≤u ′n(
yn
M
)(x∗n −
yn
M
) + un(yn
M
)
=(un(yn
M
) − yn
M
u ′n(
yn
M
)) + x∗nu ′n(
yn
M
). (16)
Therefore,
∑N
n=1 un(
yn
M ) +
β
M
∑N
n=1 y˚n∑N
n=1 un(x∗n )
.
≥
∑N
n=1
yn
M u
′
n(ynM ) +
β
M
∑N
n=1 y˚i∑N
n=1 x
∗
nu
′
n(ynM )
=
∑N
n=1⌊x∗nM⌋u ′n(
yn
M ) + β
∑N
n=1{x∗nM}∑N
n=1⌊x∗nM⌋u ′n(
yn
M ) +
∑N
n=1{x∗nM}u ′n(
yn
M )
. (17)
This indicates to find the lower bound for the efficiency, we should
only focus on utility functions un that are linear for x ≤ ynM .
Proposition 3.4 shows that f˜ (S) ≥ 2 for any subset S . Hence, the
greedy algorithmmust pick the 2 greatest bids. Letα∗ = maxn u ′n(ynM )
and so we have:
N∑
n=1
⌊x∗nM⌋u ′n(
yn
M
) ≥ 2α∗ + β(
N∑
n=1
⌊x∗nM⌋ − 2), (18)
N∑
n=1
{x∗nM}u ′n(
yn
M
) ≤ α∗
N∑
n=1
{x∗nM}. (19)
Therefore,
(17) ≥ (M − 2)β + 2α
∗
(M + 2)α∗ − 2β −
N∑
n=1
⌊x∗nM⌋(α∗ − β)
, (20)
which is increasing in
∑N
n=1⌊x∗nM⌋ because α∗ − β is always non-
negative. Since
∑N
n=1 x
∗
nM = M , we have
N∑
n=1
{x∗nM} ≤ N − 1, and
hence
N∑
n=1
⌊x∗nM⌋ ≥ max{0,M − N + 1}. (21)
Substituting (21) into (20) yields:
(17) ≥


2α∗ + (M − 2)β
(M + 2)α∗ − 2β , M < N − 1,
2α∗ + (M − 2)β
(N + 1)α∗ + (M − N − 1)β , M ≥ N − 1.
In either case, we can check that the lower bound is a decreasing
function over α∗ and we know α∗ ≤ α , therefore, we finish the
proof by letting α∗ = α . 
This lower bound is tight. Consider the examplewith two agents:
Pf = {x|x1 ≤ 1 − η,x2 ≤ 23 + η,x1 + x2 ≤ 1} and u1(x) = αx ,
u2(x) = βx . We can see in this case △f = 23 and M should be
greater than 3. If we pick M = 3, then the resulting allocation is
( 23 , 13 ), while the optimal allocation is (1 − η,η). Hence, the effi-
ciency is
2α+β
3(1−η)α+3ηβ . As η goes to 0, we achieve the lower bound,
which is
2α+β
3α .
Remark 2: When β → α , the lower bound approaches 1 and
is tight, which makes sense because in this case, all agents have
the same valuations of the resource and so the allocation is always
efficient.
The lower bound is an increasing function of number of par-
titions, which indicates the trade-off between the efficiency and
the communication cost as well. As M goes to infinity, the lower
bound goes to 1 since the mechanism approaches the VCG mecha-
nism. Moreover, for a fixed number of partitions, the lower bound
decreases as the number of agents grows, and whenN ≥ M+1, the
lower bound becomes independent of the number of agents and is
a constant given M .
4 ROUNDED QUANTIZED VCG MECHANISM
In the last section, we specified the quantized VCG mechanism
for allocating a divisible resource in a polymatroid environment
and provided a lower bound for the worst-case efficiency. In the
quantized VCGmechanism, agent n only needs to send f˜ ({n}) bids
in total to indicate her utility for the possible allocation. This is
a reduction of the dimensionality of the needed communication
- a common measure used in both the engineering literature (e.g.
[7, 9]) and in economics (e.g., this is the notion of information ef-
ficiency used by Hurowitz and Reiter [31]). However, from an in-
formation theoretic point of view, conveying a real number still
requires an infinite number of bits. In a small networked system,
agents can send a very long bids to approximate the real value, but
when the number of agents grows in the network, the total amount
of communication may be unacceptable. Hence, in this section we
further consider quantizing the bids sent by each agent in addition
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to the quantization of the resource in a large networked system
(e.g., N ≥ 10).7
Concretely, we determine a monetary unit δ . Each agent is re-
stricted to give valuations that are integer multiple of δ . Thereby,
to indicate the surrogate marginal utility, agent n needs to send
an integer vector Wˆn = {wˆn1, · · · , wˆn ˜f ({n })} to approximate her
true utility.We call the resulting mechanism the rounded quantized
VCG mechanism.
More precisely this mechanism is defined as follows:
• Determine the number of partitions and partition the re-
source into M divisions equally using Algorithm 1. Again,
denote the feasible region for number of units by P
f˜
.
• Determine and broadcast the monetary unit δ .
• Solicit and accept sealed value vectors Wˆn .
• Run the quantized VCG mechanism with marginal utility
vectors Vˆn = Wˆnδ . Break ties randomly and determine the
allocation and payment.
In other words, following this mechanism, agent n equivalently
reports another function u˜n(x) to approximate un , where
u˜n(
yn
M
) =
yn∑
m=1
wˆnmδ + β
yn
M
. (22)
As shown in Theorem 3.8, the resource allocator aims to find allo-
cation y˜∗ to maximize the sum of u˜n , e.g.,
y˜∗ = arg max
y∈P
f˜
N∑
n=1
u˜n(yn
M
). (23)
Obviously, the social welfare given by the rounded quantized
VCGmechanism is less than that given by the quantized VCG since
each agent cannot report her utility accurately. We will analyze
the loss due to this restriction later in this section. Also, here we
require that agents submit a non-increasing sequence of bids (as
we will see in the following, due to bid quantization agents may
not have an incentive to do this without the restriction). The main
reason for this restriction is that it is needed for us to use the greedy
algorithm to correctly determine the outcome and payments.
4.1 Equilibrium Analysis
It is shown in [9] that there is no dominant strategy when using
such a mechanism over a single-link network. Hence, this is also
true for our more general polymatroid setting. 8 We instead adopt
the following relaxed solution concept which allows for agents to
tolerate some loss:
Definition 4.1. Given any ϵ ≥ 0, a strategy σ∗n for agent n is
called ϵ-dominant if for all σn and σ−n ,ui (σn ,σ−n)−un(σ∗n ,σ−n ) ≤
ϵ .
In other words, for agent n, any unilateral deviation from strat-
egy σ∗n leads to at most an ϵ gain. A dominant strategy is a special
case of an ϵ-dominant strategy with ϵ = 0.
7Again this builds on work in [9], which considered a similar approach for a single
divisible resource and only one of the bidding strategies we discuss below.
8If we set all constraints to the same value, e.g., f (S ) = 1, for all S , then our problem
is reduced to a single-link problem.
Definition 4.2. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1 , · · · ,σ∗N ) forms an
ϵ-equilibrium if for every agent n, σ∗n is ϵ-dominant.
For this section, we assume agents can tolerate a lossϵ and adopt
the above solution concept. Note that this solution concept shares
the key properties of dominant strategies. For example, once again,
agents do not need any knowledge of the actions or rationality of
other players to determine their action.
One result of this relaxation in the solution concept is that agents
no longer have a unique strategy. We illustrate this in the next
three theorems, which each show a different equilibrium profile
(see also Figure 3).
Theorem4.3. Under the rounded quantizedVCGmechanismwith
given ϵ , if set δ = ϵM , then for any agent n, it is an ϵ-dominant strat-
egy to report wˆnm = ⌊ vˆnmδ ⌋ for themth partition. Moreover, if all
agents play this ϵ-dominant strategy, the maximum difference be-
tween social welfare given by the quantized VCG and the rounded
quantized VCG is η = ϵ = Mδ .
Proof. For agent n, as shown in the last section, reporting the
true surrogate marginal utility Vˆn (equivalently reportingun) is op-
timal without the quantized bid constraint and the corresponding
maximum payoff is:
max
y∈P
f˜
un(yn
M
) +
∑
j,n
u˜j (
yj
M
) − OPT(0,Wˆ−nδ ) − β
=R − OPT(0,Wˆ−nδ ) − β . (24)
Here, Wˆ−n indicates the other agents’ bids, which correspond to
u˜−n , and R = max
y∈P
f˜
un(ynM )+
∑
j,n u˜j (yjM ). Suppose agent n reports
Wn = ⌊Vnδ ⌋ and the corresponding utility function is u˜n . Given the
final allocation y˜∗, then agent n’s payoff is:
un(
y˜∗n
M
) − pn =un(
y˜∗n
M
) +
∑
j,n
u˜j (
y˜∗j
M
) − OPT(0,W˜−nδ ) − β
=L − OPT(0,W˜−nδ ) − β , (25)
where L = max
y∈P
f˜
N∑
n=1
u˜n(ynM ) + un(
y˜∗n
M ) − u˜n(
y˜∗n
M ).
To show the strategy is ϵ−dominant, it is sufficient to show L ≥
R − ϵ , which implies that agent n’s loss under this strategy is less
than ϵ compared with the maximum payoff she can get.
As shown in Fig. 3(a), by reporting the floor value, for yn =
0, 1 · · · ,M ,
u˜n(yn
M
) =
yn∑
m=1
wˆnmδ + β
yn
M
=
yn∑
m=1
⌊ vˆnm
δ
⌋δ + β yn
M
. (26)
Hence, we have:
un(
yn
M
) − ynδ ≤ u˜n(
yn
M
) ≤ un(
yn
M
) (27)
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(a) The FLOOR strategy. (b) The CEILING strategy. (c) The CEILOOR strategy.
Figure 3: Equivalent utility function u˜(x) under different strategies, the three example equilibrium strategies, where the true
utility function uˆ(x) = √x and the monetary unit δ = 0.05.
and so
L ≥ max
y∈P
f˜
N∑
n=1
u˜n(
yn
M
)
≥ max
y∈P
f˜
un(
yn
M
) +
∑
j,n
u˜j (
yj
M
) − ynδ
≥R −Mδ . (28)
Therefore, it is an ϵ-dominant strategy to report the floor value.
Next, we show that if all agents follow this strategy, the differ-
ence between the social welfare given by the quantized VCG and
the rounded quantized VCG mechanism is upper bounded by Mδ .
In other words, the loss in social welfare due to the quantized bid
constraint is no greater than Mδ . According to the definition, the
difference is:
N∑
n=1
un(
y∗n
M
) −
N∑
n=1
un(
y˜∗n
M
) ≤
N∑
n=1
u˜n(
y∗n
M
) + y∗nδ −
N∑
n=1
un(
y˜∗n
M
)
≤
N∑
n=1
u˜n(
y˜∗n
M
) −
N∑
n=1
un(
y˜∗n
M
) +Mδ
≤Mδ .
The inequality (27) is used in the last two steps. 
For simplicity, we call this the FLOOR strategy. Similarly, we
next define a CEILING strategy and again bound for loss in social
welfare.
Theorem4.4. Under the rounded quantizedVCGmechanismwith
given ϵ , if set δ = ϵM , then for any agent n, it is an ϵ-dominant strat-
egy to report wˆnm = ⌈ vˆnmδ ⌉ for themth partition. If all agents play
this ϵ-dominant strategy, the maximum difference between the social
welfare given by the quantized VCG and the rounded quantized VCG
is η = ϵ = Mδ .
The proof is similar as that for FLOOR strategy.
By reporting the floor or ceiling value, each agent has an ap-
proximation for the true utility function and makes their bids non-
decreasing, as we require. However, the bid is always smaller (greater)
than the true value if we use the FLOOR (CEILING) strategy. As we
can observe in Fig 3(a)-(b), the difference between bids and true val-
ues will accumulate and the approximation is less accurate when
x is large.
Inspired by the above two strategies, to give a better approxima-
tion of the true utility function, one may think about combining
the two strategies instead of reporting floor values or ceiling val-
ues solely. This is our third ϵ-dominant strategy, which we refer to
as the CEILOOR strategy.
Theorem4.5. Under the rounded quantizedVCGmechanismwith
given ϵ , if the number of partitionsM is even and set δ = ϵM , then it
is an ϵ2 -dominant strategy for agent n to report
wˆnm =


⌈vˆnm
δ
⌉ 0 <m ≤ M
2
⌊ vˆnm
δ
⌋ M
2
<m ≤ M .
If all agents play this strategy, the maximum difference between the
social welfare given by the quantizedVCG and the rounded quantized
VCG is η = ϵ = Mδ .
The detailed proof is omitted here.
Remark 3: Though all these strategies lead to no more than ϵ
regret, note that only the FLOOR strategy is individually rational
as in the other cases an agent’s pay-off may be negative. However,
if we also relax individual rationality to allowing for a loss of at
more ϵ , then all strategies are ϵ-individually rational.
In the previous results, we assumed that all agents choose the
same type of ϵ-dominant strategy. Next, we show that if agents
choose different types of strategies, then this can lead to larger
welfare losses.
Theorem4.6. Under the rounded quantizedVCGmechanismwith
givenϵ , ifδ = ϵM and there is no agreement among agents on the type
of ϵ-dominant strategy, then the maximum difference between social
welfare given by the quantized VCG and the rounded quantized VCG
is η = 2ϵ .
We omit the proof here for space consideration.
The preceding analysis showed that the inconsistence in the
choice of strategy may result in a loss of efficiency. This suggest
that a resource allocator may want to encourage agents to follow
the same type of strategy. Also note that the CEILOOR strategy
is more appealing because it offers a smaller bound on loss for
each agent (since it is ϵ2 -dominant instead of ϵ dominant) and thus
might be preferable. On the other hand, as noted above the FLOOR
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strategy is individually rational and so might be preferred from
that point-of-view.
Under the assumption that all agents follow the same strategy,
we hope to analyze the lower bound for efficiency in each case.
However, before divining in, one important fact should be consid-
ered that in practical setting, compared with the pay-off, the loss
each agent can tolerate should be pretty small. Hence, we further
make the following assumption to ensure that ϵ is small compared
to the possible utility an agent may obtain.
Assumption 5. For each agent, the maximum loss ϵ is smaller
than half of the minimum utility if she gets all the resource, i.e., ϵ ≤
β
2 .
This assumption provides a pretty loose upper bound for ϵ and
in fact ϵ could be much smaller than this bound in practice. Based
on the previous results, we next derive the overall worst-case effi-
ciency bounds in different scenarios.
Theorem 4.7. For a large networked system with more than 3
agents, under the rounded quantized VCG mechanism with given ϵ ,
if set δ = ϵM and all agents choose the same strategy simultaneously,
the worst-case efficiency is no less than
Mβ + 2(α − β) −Mϵ
Mα + 2(α − β) − [M − N + 1]+(α − β) .
Proof. Themain idea is simply combining the losses fromquan-
tizing the resource and the bids. The details are omitted here. 
4.2 Discussion
For a specific scenario, given a requirement for the efficiency
and ϵ , these results can be used to determine a minimum number
of partitions that we can guarantee will achieve this requirement.
LetM∗ denote the value for a given bound which meets this target.
The number of partitions a planner should choose to minimize the
communication cost is then bemax(M∗, 2△f )where the other terms
follow from Algorithm 1.
Likewise, given the number of partitions, we can study the im-
pact of the monetary unit δ . Under the three ϵ-dominant strategies
discussed, the maximum bid one may submit is ⌈α−β
Mδ
⌉ = ⌈α−βϵ ⌉,
and one agent needs at most M log2 ⌈α−βϵ ⌉ bits in total to convey
its bids to the resource allocator. We can see the trade-off between
communication cost and allocation efficiency here. If agents have
a lower tolerance of loss, which means ϵ decreases, then from The-
orem 4.7, we know the worst-case efficiency will improve but the
communication costwill increase. As ϵ goes to 0, the rounded quan-
tized VCG mechanism approaches the quantized VCG mechanism.
On the other hand, a large ϵ indicates the agents will only roughly
approximate their utility function; subsequently, the worst-case ef-
ficiency will be low but so will the required communication cost.
5 CONCLUSION
We considered two mechanisms for allocating a resource con-
strained to lie in a polymatroid capacity region with limited com-
munication exchanged: the quantized VCG mechanism and the
rounded VCG mechanism. These two mechanisms utilize quanti-
zation to reduce the communication cost between the resource al-
locator and the agents. Using the properties of polymatroids, we
showed that these mechanisms preserve the dominant strategy in-
centive properties of VCG to varying degrees. We also bounded
the worst-case efficiency for each mechanism in different scenar-
ios. There are many ways that this work could be extended includ-
ing allowing collusions among agents or considering revenue max-
imization.
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